We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1682 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2009-2017 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay-legislation. The findings provide important insights beyond the German case, not only for the impending implementation of the revised European Shareholder Rights Directive. First, we observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are closely linked to key performance measures such as return-on-assets and size. Second, and most important for our topic, our findings suggest that it is essential to take a closer look at the contractual set-up for the compensation schemes and their structure. When we only consider the compensation packages of all board members, the hypothesis that remuneration is decreased if shareholder support for compensation schemes is low in say on pay-votes finds only weak support, if any at all. However, we find that the supervisory board is responsive to say on pay-votes when it comes to the design of compensation packages for newly entering candidates, i.e. within the binding restrictions of contract law, it reacts as envisioned by policy makers. It is a consequence of the way say on pay is supposed to work that our results are driven by the rather few pronouncedly discontent say on pay-votes in corporate Germany -only where disapproval is voiced supervisory boards have reason to change compensation packages. They leave matters unaffected where shareholders show rather strong support for the proposed schemes as is the case in most of the observations in our dataset. Yet, it is important because it informs our understanding of the channels through which say on pay works. Our observations carry over to the general analytical approach for say on pay-regimes. Any evaluation of a shareholder voice-strategy in regulating executive remuneration has to pay close attention to the limits contract law sti-* Professor of Private Law, Trade and Business Law,
A. Introduction
Shareholder involvement in compensation decisions has evolved as the patent remedy that regulators choose to apply across jurisdictions when they aim to cure perceived deficits in executive pay. The latest add-on to this already impressive track record can be found in Articles 9 a and 9 b of the revised European Shareholder Rights Directive. 1 We take the impending implementation of the European legislation as occasion to test some hypothesis regarding the impact of say on pay-legislation empirically.
The relative uniformity in the general legislative approach should not disguise the considerable variation in the respective institutional arrangements. A more granular analysis 2 indicates that while some jurisdictions opt for mandatory shareholder voice others leave shareholder involvement to managerial discretion. The assessment sometimes hinges on the pertinent rules' character as non-compelling self-regulation where at the outset managers choose to either opt-in or reject the say on pay-regime. While in some cases the shareholder vote is binding, 3 it is only consultative in others with varying degrees of soft coercion. Differences also pertain to how often shareholders have to be approached and on what exactly they are asked to vote on (remuneration policy, individual compensation packages ex post or ex ante etc.).
At least in part, the observed differences can be traced to disagreement on say on pay's merits in general and its adequate design in particular. Furthermore, in comparative perspective, say on pay's potential to add value may also hinge on existing institutional alternatives: corporate law may either provide other governance arrangements that seek to align managements' remuneration packages with shareholder interests or -more broadly -pursue different strategies to prevent executive rent seeking. 4 This paper tries to shed light on some of these key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German legisla- (2016), 500, 504 present data reflecting the status of say on pay-regulation in 38 jurisdictions, yet cannot account for the intricacies of the legal regimes they survey because coding requires the authors to make distinct decisions also in cases of doubt. They thus sacrifice many mezzanine-levels of distinction; for further criticism with regard to specific findings see Thomas/Van der Elst, (fn. 5), 655. many is by no means a unique example, but has interesting characteristics in several respects.
First, in its say on pay-regime Germany has opted for a voluntary, 6 non-binding shareholder consultation that pertains only to the general compensation scheme and attaches practically no legal sanctions to the vote. 7 Hence, in pertinent part German corporate law relies purely on market discipline as a function of negative cost of capital-effects that poor corporate governance should entail in efficient markets once the issuer deviates from revealed shareholder preferences.
8 It therefore differs from those institutional set-ups that provide for rather rigid legal consequences in case of shareholder discontent and thus bolster shareholder voice with law's momentum. 9 Second, direct shareholder involvement in compensation decisions represents a legal transplant, which runs counter to the German tradition that vests the right to determine executive compensation with shareholder-and labor 10 -representatives on the supervisory board (two-tier system). Hence, say on pay 6 For a shareholder vote on compensation to occur, the topic has to be put on the agenda of the general meeting. This usually occurs through a management board initiative, see Aktiengesetz (AktG) [Stock Corporation Act], 6 September 1965, BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) I at 1089, § 121, para. 2 sentence 1, para. 3 sentence 1, but can also be achieved by minority shareholders who hold 5% of the corporation's legal capital or a fraction of it that amounts to EUR 500.000 in nominal value, § 122, para. 2 sentence 1 AktG. Not even the self-regulatory German Corporate Governance Code that relies on a complyor-explain-mechanism contains a recommendation to consult the shareholder meeting in compensation matters (see also infra note 66). 7 § 120, para. 4 AktG provides that the shareholder meeting of a listed company may resolve on the approval of the compensation scheme. The resolution shall not give rise to any rights or obligations; in particular, the obligations of the supervisory board pursuant to § 87 AktG shall remain unaffected. The resolution shall not be voidable pursuant to § 243 AktG. Governance, 1999, p. 163, 174-175. may either improve a deficient arrangement or constitute a redundant, costhiking institution. More dramatic, the shift of competences from the supervisory board to the shareholder meeting that say on pay implies may even corrupt a well-functioning and theoretically sound governance arrangement. 11 In this regard, our findings are relevant for all jurisdictions that adhere to a twotier structure in organizational law.
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Finally, looking at Germany is also rewarding insofar as the rather concentrated ownership structure of its firms 13 allows assessing, whether a formal say on pay-regime is nothing but a (superfluous) substitute for the influence a large blockholder usually has at hand through informal channels.
14 In the latter case, the impact of the regime's introduction should vary across firms depending on their ownership structure and be stronger in firms without a dominant shareholder. Again our findings are immediately relevant for policy makers in jurisdictions where large public firms have comparable ownership structures which seems to be the case in most economies around the world.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first briefly survey the theoretical and empirical scholarship on the merits of direct shareholder involvement in compensation decisions and thus position our contribution in relation to the existing literature (infra B). We start our own investigation with a short description of the institutional changes that characterize the German legislative experiment (infra C). The paper continues with a description of our sample and the variables we design. In this section we also develop the hypotheses for our empirical analysis (infra D). In the latter we provide descriptive statistics and estimate regressions (infra E). We finally conclude (infra F).
B. Shareholder Involvement in Board Remuneration: Theory and Evidence
I. Incentive Compensation as Solution to Agency Conflicts and the Significance of Direct Shareholder Involvement
At first glance, the rationale underpinning the success story of say on pay-regimes across jurisdictions is straightforward and intuitive. The optimal contracting approach to executive compensation considers adequately designed incentive compensation as a powerful tool to attenuate the principal agent conflict between (dispersed) shareholders and managers. 16 The substantial criticism that was voiced, particularly during the last decade, does not challenge the basic presumptions of the approach that incentive compensation may align managers' interest with shareholder preferences. Yet, it posits that executives in public firms without dominant blockholders may have the power to influence compensation decisions in their favor and thus hamper optimal contracting from a shareholder perspective. 17 From this vantage, a plausible route to trim managers' de facto control over remuneration decisions would alleviate small shareholders' collective action and information problems by putting executive compensation schemes or even individual compensation packages up for properly informed voting at the shareholder meeting. 18 Indeed surveys show that institutional investors exhibit a great interest in proper incentive compensation.
19 They should thus benefit from the voting rights they become vested with, 20 although the guidance they receive from information intermediaries will play a pivotal role in their compensation decisions as well. 21 However, diverging risk-preferences among shareholders and the costs of bargain- adhere to this motto. 26 Hence, the introduction of a say on pay-regime should not necessarily have a significant effect on total compensation levels.
III. Prior Empirical Analyses
Most empirical surveys test the impact of say on pay in the U.K., certainly not least because this jurisdiction was the front-runner of the movement. 27 These analyses are mainly concerned with the driving forces behind shareholder dissent and/or low approval rates 28 and their effect on executive compensation. Some studies investigate the direct link between negative voting turnouts and changes to individual employment contracts.
29 Others look at general and persistent changes in remuneration practices that could indicate a closer alignment of managers' incentives with shareholder interests as a result of the introduction of the U.K. say on pay-regime. These studies generally find (weak) evidence for such a link.
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Similar research also scrutinizes the Australian and U. S. situation, looking at both the reasons for low approval rates and observable changes in compensation practices in response to the introduction of a say on pay-regime. Event studies that seek to determine shareholders' assessment of say on payregimes by investigating cumulative abnormal returns for the date of the pertinent rule's announcement were first conducted for the U. S. 32 Subsequent contributions in this line were motivated by the U.K. experience 33 and the Swiss policy experiment of 2008 with its introduction of a binding say on pay-vote in a referendum. 34 Methodologically related research scrutinizes the effect of the introduction of say on pay through precatory shareholder proposals in the U. S. 35 This strand of literature forms a subsection of surveys that seek to determine the general effect of shareholder empowerment on firm value. 36 An empirical study 37 that tries to find the determinants that drive negative votes in U. S. say on pay-decisions considers inter alia total stock returns as performance measure, but does not analyze a time-series to gauge the medium-term effects that the introduction of the say on pay-regime under DoddFrank may entail. Earlier studies also investigate the drivers of voting support for pay-related (non-binding) shareholder proposals in the U. S. and also specify their effect on CEO compensation.
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Finally, a comprehensive study that surveys 38 jurisdictions also looks specifically at the correlation between say on pay and the design of compensation packages, thereby distinguishing carefully between the remuneration of CEOs and that of ordinary board members. 39 The analysis delineates a deceleration in the growth of CEO pay and its consequential approximation to that of ordinary board members.
Our study is similar to the strand of research that tries to measure say on pay's medium term effect on general compensation practices 40 and goes thus beyond surveys in the legal literature that only present descriptive statistics on voting outcomes. 41 We use a hand-collected dataset to analyze the German legislative experiment. Limiting ourselves to one jurisdiction allows us to proxy some of its relevant characteristics in more detail and thus shed new light on key hypotheses articulated in the debate. We pay particular attention to the link between say on pays' impact on executive compensation as well as firm performance measures. The specificity of our data that distinguishes between several features in board members' compensation packages and accounts for executives' tenure allows us to significantly extend and challenge more general findings in similar research on Germany that show that say on pay has an effect on directors' remuneration if lagged over the years following the vote. 42 As already indicated, despite our close attention to German firms' specific corporate governance characteristics, our findings extend well beyond the German context, because many firms around the world have similar organizational and ownership structures (two-tier system, dominant blockholders).
39 Correa/Lel (fn. 2), 500. 40 It is a common feature of all these studies that they consider principal-agent-conflicts between managers and (dispersed) shareholders. A recent study turns to the Israeli experience with a majority-of-the minority vote for compensation packages paid to the controlling shareholder or their relatives, i.e. a horizontal agency conflict between large and small equityholders. 
C. The German Legislative Experiment: the 2009 Amendments to the Stock Corporation Act
This section briefly describes the legislative changes Germany promulgated in 2009 (infra I) and puts them into a broader context that also highlights the main features of their implementation in practice (infra II). In particular the latter information should also help recognize why and to what extent the findings of the paper are relevant for other jurisdictions that are similarly situated.
I. The 2009 Amendments to the AktG
The amendments to the German AktG that constitute the point of reference for our analysis were part of a broader reform package that purportedly reacted to the financial crises of 2007/2008. Yet, in an act of political overreaching it brought about new rules for all German stock corporations despite a lack of resilient evidence of pervasive deficits. Across industries, the legislative intervention sought to enhance managers' incentives to pursue sustainable growth strategies. In order to achieve this goal, the main changes were directed towards the supervisory boards' broad discretionary power to determine executive directors' compensation, 43 without withdrawing the power as such. Prior to the 2009 reform, the AktG only prescribed that the supervisory board should set management board members' remuneration in adequate relation to their respective duties and the overall situation of the firm. 44 The new law specifies the pivotal adequacy-criterion, also by introducing an explicit duty to reduce managers' compensation if the situation of the firm deteriorates. 45 However, the substance of the new regime does not go materially beyond the determinants that were derived under the old regime by means of statutory interpretation. 46 The same can be said mutatis mutandis with regard to the now 43 In addition, the reform also introduced a minimum deductible of 10% of total losses if managers' personal liability is covered by a D&O insurance policy taken out by the corporation, § 93, para. 2 sentence 3 AktG, and a cooling-off period of two years if members of the management board intend to switch to the supervisory board, § 102, para. 2 sentence 1 No. 4 AktG. 44 § 87, para. 1 sentence 1 AktG as in force until 2009. 45 § 87, para. 1 AktG stipulates that compensation should be performance based, be in line with usual compensation practices, aim at a sustainable development of the firm, use multi-annual determinants, and provide for caps in extraordinary circumstances. The duty to seek a reduction of the compensation in reaction to adverse developments for the corporation is laid down in § 87, para. 2 AktG. 46 For a detailed discussion see Benedikt Hohaus/Christoph Weber, "Die Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung gem. § 87 AktG nach dem VorstAG", Der Betrieb 62 (2009), explicit stipulation of the liability of the members of the supervisory board who breach their duties in setting management board members' remuneration packages: 47 prior to the reform, the liability was derived from the general provision in AktG, § 116, para. 1 and attached to a violation of the respective duties that were largely identical in substance under the old legal regime.
As a consequence, the introduction of the voluntary, non-binding say on payvote 48 constitutes the only true institutional innovation of the VorstAG. Studying its effects thus seems promising. Although it cannot be ruled out that the general political, manager-hostile attitude that triggered and supported the regulatory initiative also carries over to the reactions of German supervisory boards in the vicinity of the reform, at least the medium term effects that occur after the public discontent has abated, should be attributable to the regulatory overhaul.
II. Context and Implementation
The VorstAG is yet another instance in a line of legislative interventions that respond to the persistent and widespread sentiment among many voters that executive compensation in Germany is broken because it is out of line with shareholder preferences. Similar motivations were given for a 2005 amendment of the relevant accounting laws that sought to enhance the transparency of executive compensation 49 and an attempt to tighten the say on pay regime that ultimately failed in 2013 only because the legislative period terminated prior to a final vote in parliament. 50 Against this background, the 2009 amendments do not react to an abnormal public outcry or a meaningful change in the social perception of managerial compensation that could drive results regardless of institutional changes. Instead, the VorstOG seems to belong to a continuous 1515; Stefan Lingemann, "Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung -Das VorstAG ist in Kraft", Betriebs-Berater 64 (2009) pattern of normatively consistent reactions that occur in a generally skeptical environment.
The prescribed say on pay-vote occurs at the annual general meeting on the initiative of either the management board or a qualified minority of shareholders. 51 At listed companies, votes are cast under a strict one share one vote-rule. 52 The attendance at the meetings is usually significantly below the number of voting stock outstanding and therefore 25 to 30 percent of the shares carrying voting rights afford a stable majority. 53 Finally, the agenda of the general meeting has to include a resolution on the discharge of the members of the management and the supervisory board.
54 This is important, because the vote on managers' discharge provides for a well-established channel through which shareholders can express their discontent with boards' performance, which should in turn keep say on pay-votes largely free of more general considerations of this type.
D. Data and Methodology

I. Sample Description
To investigate the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany, we hand-collected a data set for Germany's major firms, i.e. those included in the main stock market index, the DAX30, for the years 2009-2017. We produced data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. In order to identify ceteris paribus trends that are attributable to the introduction of say on pay, we concentrated on those companies that were included in the DAX30 at least during a part of the entire period, but existed as listed firms at all times. We thus end up with 34 companies in our sample. This gives us information on 1682 remuneration packages of 415 management board members. board during the observation period. The remaining 25 executives were already board members in 2009 and stayed in their position until the end of the observation period without becoming CEO during this time. The average size of the management board in the sample is 6.3 members, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11 managers (including the CEO). The composition of our company base traces very closely the structure of the German economy with five financial firms (two banks, 55 a financial exchange, and two insurance companies), five car manufacturers and suppliers as well as nine pharmaceutical companies (including chemical firms as well as medicine technique companies). The remaining firms are mainly other manufacturing companies.
Our data sample comprises information on management compensation, firm performance and general firm characteristics (such as size and industry to which the companies belong). The data on management remuneration was taken from the firms' annual reports for the respective years. As a consequence of a 2005 overhaul of the relevant accounting requirements, 56 executive compensation packages are reported on an individual basis for each member of the management board and have to be itemized with regard to fixed, variable and long-term incentive components.
57 Hence, we are in a position to track executive compensation over time. In doing so we pay close attention to the applicable accounting standards that particularly affect the representation of longterm components. 58 figures actually reveal whereas prior research largely treated them as current payout. Information on say on pay-votes (including the percentage turnouts of these votes in favor or against the respective proposals) are also taken from the company accounts. We checked for completeness and accuracy by consulting the firms' websites and the corporate register. 59 The general firm characteristics, such as size and return on assets are drawn from Datastream for the respective years. Information on shareholder returns is also taken from Datastream. We derive the data on ownership structures from Commerzbank's compendium "Wer gehört zu wem".
60 This data source comprises detailed information on ownership structures of German firms and their changes over time. We impound new information (since 2010) on significant holdings from the corporate register.
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II. Description of Variables
The compensation reports-as mandatory items of the company accountsprovide detailed information on the remuneration of individual members of the management board. 62 Companies report not only the total level of compensation but also its structure in considerable detail. In particular, the different types of variable pay such as cash bonuses, stock options and long-term incentive plans are disclosed. However, this granular reporting makes comparisons across companies and over time quite difficult: not only do the observed compensation structures diverge materially but also the ways of reporting change over time, because firms do not have to comply with a prescribed form that would standardize disclosure. 63 Hence, despite the risk of sacrificing some 59 Pursuant to § 130, para. 6 AktG, German listed companies have to post detailed information on the votes (yes, no, abstain) for each resolution on their website within seven days. The pertinent information is also filed with the register, see § 130, para 5 AktG. granularity, we decided to focus on the three main pillars of the compensation packages: fixed pay, variable remuneration and pension benefits. While fixed payments and pension contributions paid for the members of the management board are rather uniform, there is quite some variation with regard to variable pay across time and companies, which should be kept in mind.
By looking at these three elements of managers' remuneration packages, we cover the main elements of monetary compensation and incentive schemes: fixed pay reflecting the overall participation constraint of management board members, variable pay as pay-for-performance (aligning the objectives of management and shareholders by incentivizing managers to provide effort 64 ), and pension contributions paid for management board members as inside debt (to provide incentives to reduce risk and avoid default 65 ).
In order to achieve sufficient discrimination we extract four variables from the firms' compensation reports. The first variable (FIX) reflects the fixed payments of the members of the management board, whereas the second variable (VARPAY) is the sum of all variable compensation of the respective manager in a given year. In cases in which incentive plans were designed for more than one year, we divide the total amount reported at grant equally over the respective years and add the split-parts to VARPAY for each year. Our third variable (TEXP) is simply adding up these two elements and hence stands for total yearly payments ex pensions. Given that we have missing observations for pension contributions in a number of cases, we rely on this variable as our main measure of total compensation. Last but not least, our PENSION variable denotes the annual pension contribution paid for the respective member of the management board. Table 1 In a first step, we look into the main descriptive statistics of our data set. Tables  2 a and 2 b give a first overview of the main realizations of these variables. We distinguish between the remuneration of CEOs and non-CEO members of the management board. With respect to pay structure, these numbers indicate that sources of income which are usually regarded as pay-for-performance are on average the most important remuneration elements for members of the management board. They clearly exceed the sum of fixed payments and pension contributions that managers receive (see Tables 2 a and 2b) . Surprisingly, pension contributions paid for management board members are rather small. If we compare the mean and median of the different variables we find that this skewedness is not very pronounced. Hence, we can state that there clearly is variation with some (but not many) highly paid top managers (all CEOs), but that the discrepancies are not very large. More generally, a comparison of Tables 2 a and 2 b reveals visible, though not very large differences in compensation levels (but not structure) of CEOs on the one hand and non-CEO management board members on the other.
Furthermore, we collected data to define a number of variables reflecting firm characteristics and firm performance. Since we aim to relate these variables to the variation in management board compensation and to investigate whether we find an effect of say on pay-votes after including these variables as controls, we focus on those variables that according to the literature are the main determinants of compensation packages for top managers. With respect to firm characteristics, we chose measures for size, namely total assets (TA), and ownership concentration, defined as voting block of 25% or more of the shares outstanding (OWC), as well as industry dummies (for the financial, the car and the pharmaceutical industry). We measure firm performance by return-on-assets incurred in the respective year (ROA) defined as EBIT over TA. Our total shareholder return variable (TSR) comprises share price developments and dividends paid. We also looked into other firm characteristics as well as performance measures but the variables ultimately used turned out to have the closest relation to management compensation. The realizations of these variables are depicted in Tables 3 a and 3b . Table 3 a shows that there is substantial variation in firm characteristics and performance. This indicates on the one hand that the DAX30 companies differ, in pertinent respect, to a large extent among themselves. Moreover, as we will show in the next step, there is also substantial variation, especially with respect to profitability, over time.
Before we turn to this analysis, we comment on the say on pay-votes in the DAX30 companies that occurred after the 2009 amendment of the AktG (see Table 3b ). Most companies in our data sample had a vote on management board remuneration in 2010. In 2011 to 2017 these votes took only place occasionally which is largely a function of the relevant best practice recommendation in the German Corporate Governance Code. 66 We construct a variable, which documents the acceptance rate of the votes in the shareholder meeting (SOP); we obtain the latter from the corporate register. 67 If no vote has taken place, we assign a value of zero to this variable; excluding these values leaves our results largely unaffected.
We observe 72 (out of 237) company data points with say on pay-votes. Most of these resolutions had rather high acceptance rates, most of them above 85%, many of them even above 95%. 68 There are only four exceptions in which compensation schemes were rejected. At Heidelberg Cement we observe the lowest acceptance rate of 45.81% in 2010. In 2016 Deutsche Bank received less than 50% yes-votes (48.1%) while the same thing happened in 2017 at Merck (46%) and Münchener Rück (34.3%). In addition, where companies report abstentions 69 (more than 80% of the obervations) we observe only very few of them (typically well below 1%), with no particular trend. There are many reasons other than abstentions that may lead to the sum of yes-and no-votes being lower than the total voting shares represented in the shareholder meeting (e.g. void votes, treasury stock and other specific voting prohibitons). The data does not allow to distinguish between the respective instances. Therefore, we cannot identify the abstentions in the remaing observations. As a general trend, the mean share of supporting say on pay-votes stayed more or less constant over the observation period but went down significantly in 2016 and 2017. 
III. Hypotheses
We explore two alternative hypotheses to address the impact of say on payvotes. The first hypothesis conjectures that relatively lower acceptance ratios lead to an adjustment (reduction) in the remuneration package of all management board members. 70 We test this with our SOP variable while taking further effects into account by including a number of control variables in our panel regressions.
The second, alternative hypothesis is that the supervisory board 71 primarily reacts by changing the compensation practices observed in the contracts of newly entering members of the management board and leaves the contracts of the existing executives untouched. This hypothesis seems highly plausible from a basic contract law perspective: although the supervisory board is competent to determine the remuneration of the members of the executive board when they are appointed, 72 it basically lacks the power to interfere unilaterally with existing employment contracts without cause. 73 Hence, it is unlikely that with a view to unfavorable say on pay-votes, supervisory boards adapt (reduce) executive compensation packages immediately and universally. However, at least 70 This accords with similar findings in empirical studies of the U.K. situation: Ferri/Marber (fn. 27), 529 find a "significant increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance" as a result of high shareholder discontent; Carter/Zamora (fn. 28), 24 report that boards respond to sizeable dissent by decelerating compensation increases relative to competitors and curbing diluting stock option grants; Alissa (fn. 28), 26-29, on the other hand, sees no evidence for a change in compensation practices but identifies replacement of CEOs as an alternative response to shareholder dissent; conversely, Conyon/ Sadler (fn. 28), 304 find only "little evidence of a relation between CEO pay and shareholder dissent". Our first hypothesis also conforms with evidence from the U. S., although some incidents suggest that companies also stay the course and blame misinformed proxy-advisors for negative votes, Thomas/Palmiter/Cotter (fn. 18), 1260; on a broader data basis that exploits the five reporting seasons following the enactment of Dodd-Franck, Pawliczek (fn. 31) shows that higher voting dissent leads to a 2.3% decrease in stock options and a 3.9% increase in performance-vested equity in the total compensation package with an unclear effect of the changes on performance-sensitivity; for a highly skeptical view on the U. S. practice pointing particularly to a short-term focus of institutional investors in say on pay-voting Stephen for those management board members who are appointed after an adverse resolution, compensation arrangements designed with a view to expressed discontent in shareholder polls are intuitive. This leads us to expect significant changes in the compensation packages of newly entering members (compared to prior practice) in reaction to low say on pay-votes: the supervisory board will only gradually implement a new remuneration policy 74 that is better attuned to shareholder preferences. We test this second hypothesis by splitting our sample and taking newly entering and incumbent board members separately into account.
E. Empirical Results
I. Descriptive Analysis
As a first step of our analysis of the determinants of managers' remuneration (level and structure) we investigate the evolution of the total level of compensation as well as its performance-based fraction together with a key operative measure for firm performance (return on assets) on the aggregate level. We use Table 3 c to depict this relationship. Table 3 c also indicates the sensitivity of variable management pay to firm performance. The (Pearson) correlation coefficient between TEXP and ROA at the aggregate level (across years) is an astonishing 0.67. The same holds true for variable pay and ROA (0.688). Both coefficients are significantly different from zero (at the ten percent level). Accounting for unobserved time-invariant characteristics by using time fixed effects, the correlation coefficient with ROA becomes lower but is still 0.464, yet no longer significant. If we look into the same correlations with ROA lagging one period, a very similar picture emerges. We investigate this relation in a multivariate setting in the next subsection. German incentive plans are typically based on operative performance measures rather than on share price developments. Therefore, we focus on operative performance measures only.
II. Multivariate Tests
Up to now we did not sufficiently take the panel structure of our data set into account. Hence, the aim of this subsection is to exploit the variation in the cross-section as well as over time simultaneously. We run multivariate regressions on our panel data set and take the different compensation variables as dependent variables. This includes our variable measuring total compensation (we initially exclude pensions in order to avoid losing too many observations due to missing entries) as well as our fixed-pay variable. Later on, we also investigate the pension compensation schemes in more detail.
We proceed in various steps. In the first one, we aim to explain the compensation variables by using the information on all board members for the respective compensation variables. Then, we take a more granular look and separate newly appointed members of the corporations' management board from those board members who served in this capacity already for a longer period of time.
In particular, we ask how the say on pay-votes affected compensation packages of established and newly entering board members differently. Thereby, we test our two alternative hypotheses. Besides using our SOP variable, we reflect findings in the prior literature 75 and control for the effect of firm performance and size on the compensation packages of management board members. In addition, we include industry dummies as well as time and company fixed effects. We thereby account for unobserved heterogeneity across time and companies, which affects the compensation packages.
Hence, we estimate the following equation
with our compensation variables forming the left hand side variables and the χ it standing for our explanatory variables as described above. The error term is displayed by μ it . In order to take the potential non-linearity of the estimated relationships into account we use the natural logarithms of our compensation variables, firm characteristics, and performance measures. In order to account for correlated error terms at the level of individual board members (e.g. due to the fixed structure of the compensation packages of board members for a pre-determined number of years) we cluster standard errors at this level.
Effect of Say on Pay on Compensation
Tables 4 and 5 summarize our findings on the effects on total compensation (TEXP). While Table 4 investigates hypothesis 1, Table 5 looks into hypothesis 2. Table 4 considers all management board members while Table 5 focusses on the effects of say on pay on newly entering members of the management boards.
75 See for instance Xavier Gabaix/Augustin Landier, "Why has CEO pay increased so much?", The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2008), 49-100 (explaining the influence of firm size on executive compensation). Firm performance, measured by return on assets, is considered in many studies to be a key determinant of executive pay, see Correa/Lel (fn. 2). (1)- (5) cover all management board members. In model (6) we exclude those board members who have just entered the board in the respective year. Significance levels are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
lnTEXP (1) lnTEXP (2) lnTEXP (3) lnTEXP (4) lnTEXP (5) lnTEXP (1) lnTEXP (2) lnTEXP (3) lnTEXP (4) With respect to our say on pay-variable we find a mostly positive, yet statistically insignificant effect for the overall sample (see Table 4 ). Hence, we see no support for our hypothesis 1. The findings in Table 4 are robust to a number of different specifications. Neither the inclusion of year and company fixed effects nor that of industry dummies changes the picture. The same holds true if we include controls for entering and leaving board members. In order to rule out that special effects are driving our results, we exclude in our analysis of the full sample (we would lose too many observations in the smaller sample) in one specification (see Table 4 ) Commerzbank, which was bailed-out by the German financial market stabilization fund in 2008 and 2009 and had to comply with regulatory salary caps as a consequence: the government rescue obliged the bank to limit the remuneration to 500,000 Euro for its top personnel. 76 We further exclude in this specification the four companies which had say on pay-votes below 50%. We find that our results remain robust to the exclusion of these observations. Furthermore, the exclusion of newly appointed board members (see last column of Table 4 ) does not change the picture either.
In order to address our second hypothesis we focus in Table 5 on newly appointed board members. We find that the coefficient of the say on pay-variable is statistically significant and positive throughout all our specifications in Table 5 (resembling structurally the ones from Table 4 ). This implies that say on pay-votes have a statistically significant and positive effect on the overall compensation of newly appointed board members. This is clear evidence in favor of our second hypothesis.
Given the restrictions defined in contract law, 77 our findings do not really come as a surprise. Instead, they can be readily explained by a lack of bargaining power of supervisory boards vis-à-vis incumbents. During their tenure, managers cannot be compelled to accept a decrease in their remuneration packages-or any rearrangement with such an effect-if the supervisory board wishes to react to shareholder discontent by slashing managers' pay checks. Moreover, our findings accord with the legislative strategy that empowers shareholders to resolve on the overarching compensation system and not individual compensation packages: this implies that the supervisory board reacts to negative voting turnouts over time when remuneration is up for negotiations. However, for those management board members, who were newly appointed around the promulgation of the VorstAG, compensation arrangements designed with a view to the anticipated shareholder polls or the realized SOP decisions are plausible. In line with this idea we find strong evidence for our second hypothesis. SOP votes have a significant effect on compensation schemes of newly entering members of management boards. In other words, the regulatory strategy works within the binding restrictions put up in contract law. This is an important contribution to the existing literature because it indicates that in all jurisdictions with staggered and entrenched boards say on pay's effects are rather long-term. Therefore, they can only be fully gauged if compensation is analyzed over a longer period (ideally full turnover of the entire board 78 ) whereas measuring only short-term effects may underestimate the regime's momentum.
Beyond our results on the effects of say on pay-votes, we find that total compensation of the management board members in Germany's DAX30 companies is clearly influenced by firm structure and firm performance. More profit-77 See supra D.II. 78 The maximum tenure permitted by law is 5 years, which regularly makes for deeply staggered management boards. The important takeaway for our analysis is thus that every year about one fifth of the management board should be up for (re-)appointment.
able and larger firms pay more to their management board members. This pattern emerges consistently across the different models in Tables 4 and 5 . The effects are not only statistically but also economically pronounced. A one percent increase in profitability increased total compensation of board members by between 0.5 to 1% (see columns (1)-(6) of Table 4 ). With respect to size we find a less pronounced and less often significant effect (see Tables 4 and 5 ).
In Tables 6 and 7 we investigate the effect of say on pay on fixed compensation as well as on the pension packages board members received during the time period under investigation. With respect to fixed payments we observe a similar pattern as with the overall payments. This is a confirmation of our results on our two hypotheses as discussed above. For the overall sample (hypothesis 1) we find statistically insignificant coefficients (see first three columns in Table 6 ) for a number of specifications (the ones we used previously). On the other hand, if we focus on the newly entering board members-and hence on hypothesis 2-we observe again a statistically significant coefficient (see last three columns of Table 6 ). Hence, the very same pattern emerges as in our analysis of the overall compensation. The picture is weaker for our analysis of the pension packages. The coefficients of the overall sample are statistically insignificant in two out of three specifications (see columns one and three of Table 7 ). In one specification we find a weakly significant coefficient (at the ten percent level) which has, however, a negative sign (see column 2 of Table 7 ). If we focus on entering board members with a new contractual arrangement we find a positive, yet non-significant effect of our say on pay-variable (see last two columns of Table 7 ).
Robustnesschecks
After our discussion of the main findings, we now turn to two robustness checks. First, we separate the analysis of the effect of say on pay votes on the compensation packages of CEOs from that of the impact on non-CEO executive board members' compensation packages. This helps us rule out that our results are driven by the effects on one group, say the CEOs, only. Second, we address the effect of ownership concentration in order to investigate if ownership concentration is a potential substitute for a say on pay-regime.
a) CEOs vs non-CEOs
In Table 8 we investigate whether our findings on the effect of say on payvotes on executive compensation are affected if we distinguish between CEOs and non-CEO executive board members. For this purpose we split our sample in a non-CEO subsample (first three columns of Table 8 ) and a CEO subsample (last two columns of Table 8 ). Our qualitative results are not affected by this exercise. While the say on pay-variable is insignificant for the estimates that include all members in the respective subsamples (first and last two respective columns of Table 8 ), the say on pay-coefficient is positive and significant for the new entrants in the non-CEO subsample (column in the middle of Table 8 ). Unfortunately, due to the very small sample size (nine observations), it is impossible to run a sufficiently powerful regression on the newly entering CEOs. In an untabulated regression with the say on pay-vote as only regressor we find a positive yet non-significant coefficient. 
b) Relevance of Ownership Concentration
We also bring the role of shareholder composition into the picture. 79 By using our ownership concentration variable, we ask whether the presence of blockholders has an effect on compensation. In particular, whether they act as substitute for say on pay-resolutions. We find partial evidence for the former aspect. In our full-sample regression (Table 9 , first two columns) it turns out that more concentrated ownership indeed leads to a statistically significant (positive) effect on overall pay. In the new entrant-sample this effect is not observable (see Table 9, last two columns). But in both cases the introduction of the ownership variable leaves our findings on the say on pay-variable qualitatively unchanged indicating that ownership does not act as a substitute for say on pay-votes. Table 9 : The impact of SOP on total compensation: the effect of ownership. We estimate linear regressions on our panel data set with the natural logarithm of total compensation ex pension (TEXP) as left hand side variable. The table shows the estimated effects of the regressions with the standard errors clustered at the level of the management board members. We report standard errors in parentheses. By adding our ownership variable we investigate the impact of ownership concentration on the link between SOP and compensation. Models (1) and (2) use the entire sample, models (3) and (4) only the newly entering members of the management boards. Significance levels are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
